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The observation of behaviour is a key theoretical parameter underlying a
number of models of prosociality. However, the empirical findings showing
the effect of observability on prosociality are mixed. In this meta-analysis,
we explore the boundary conditions that may account for this variability, by
exploring key theoretical and methodological moderators of this link. We
identified 117 papers yielding 134 study level effects (total n ¼ 788 164) and
found a small but statistically significant, positive association between obser-
vability and prosociality (r ¼ 0.141, 95% confidence interval ¼ 0.106, 0.175).
Moderator analysis showed that observability produced stronger effects on
prosociality: (i) in the presence of passive observers (i.e. people whose role
was to only observe participants) versus perceptions of being watched, (ii)
when participants’ decisions were consequential (versus non-consequential),
(iii) when the studies were performed in the laboratory (as opposed to in the
field/online), (iv) when the studies used repeated measures (instead of
single games), and (v) when the studies involved social dilemmas (instead
of bargaining games). These effects show the conditions underwhich observa-
bility effects on prosociality will be maximally observed. We describe the
theoretical and practical significance of these results.1. Introduction
There are a number of possible ultimate-proximate accounts for why altruism sur-
vives in the population [1–3]. For example, kin selection and inclusive fitness offer
an ultimate functional account of altruism that is enacted, at a proximate level, by
mechanisms of kin detection [4,5]. Here, we explore functional level theories of
altruism/prosociality that focus on the capacity of altruistic acts to signal desirable
traits andqualities of the signaller (costly signalling theory, reciprocityand comple-
tive altruism). These desirable altruistic traits may provide a fitness advantage by
being sexually selected [6] and/or increase the probability that the signallerwill be
helped in the future [7]. Specifically, we focus on one key component of these func-
tional accounts: the link between the observability of a prosocial act and the degree
of prosociality displayed. We also explore themoderating effects of key theoretical
mechanisms (e.g. possibility for repeat interactions).
A number of functional theoretical accounts propose that the survival of pro-
social behaviour depends on the signalling of desirable traits. This is premised on
these traits being observable. For example, cost signalling theory (CST) suggests
that observable acts signal the actor’s qualities to potential mates [8]. Furthermore,
for reciprocity (either direct or indirect) to be effective in maintaining prosociality,
others need to be aware of the prosocial behaviour either directly (e.g. directly
observed) or indirectly (e.g. via gossip) [9]. However, the empirical literature,
based on both laboratory and the field studies, offers mixed findings, with evi-
dence that observability increases [10,11], decreases [12] or has no effect [13,14]
on prosociality.We propose that this variability reflects the presence or the absence
of key theoretical design features, ormechanisms, that are required for the effect of
observability on prosociality to emerge. These theoretical design featuresmark the
boundary conditions for the emergence of observability–prosociality effects. For




2should lead to increased levels of prosocial behaviour. If the
mechanism of consequentiality is not part of a study’s design,
effects of observability will be weaker or non-existent. We
examine this as one of many theoretically mechanisms that
should moderate the observability–prosociality link.
While the literature on one aspect of observability—the
presence of images of ‘watching eyes’—on prosociality has
been reviewed [15–17], there is no systematic review of the
effect that observability, in general, has on prosociality.
Thus, a systematic review and meta-analysis of this literature
to identify the boundary conditions for the observability–
prosociality link is important for two reasons. First, given
the importance of observability to theories of prosociality,
a more nuanced understanding of boundary conditions
will enhance our theoretical understandings. Second,
while a number of charities use observability as a means to
enhance revenues [10], the evidence is not clear as to how
effective this is, or what features of manipulations positively
impact fundraising.116(a) Theoretical accounts of observability and prosociality
Below we outline the three main functional accounts of pro-
sociality that rely on observability of prosocial behaviours:
CST [8,18], competitive altruism [19,20] and reciprocity [9].
CST suggests that observability of costly prosocial acts is
used to advertise to others their qualities as a potential part-
ner or member of their group [18]. Competitive altruism
suggests that human competitiveness influences prosocial
displays, with people competing to gain a good reputation
through displays of their prosocial qualities [21,22].
With respect to reciprocity, direct and indirect reciprocity
can be distinguished [23]. Direct reciprocity occurs where an
individual (A) performs a generous act to help another (B)
and B subsequently repays A (A helps B, B then helps A)
[9]. Indirect reciprocity comes in two forms: upstream and
downstream [9]. In upstream reciprocity, an individual who
has received help goes on to help others (A helps B, then B
helps C), whereas downstream reciprocity occurs when a
person who has helped others in the past has a higher likeli-
hood of being helped by others in the future (A helps B, then
C helps A) [19]. Upstream reciprocity is driven by the psycho-
logical mechanism of gratitude (B is grateful to A, so helps C)
and downstream reciprocity by reputation building (B gains
reputation from helping A, so is helped by C) [19,24]. For
both direct reciprocity and downstream indirect reciprocity,
reputation is the most likely mechanism operating and this
requires that the prosocial act is observable either directly
or via gossip.
The consistent prediction of these theories is that the effect
of observability should be strongest, or only apparent, when
the display of prosociality increases the helpers’ reputation,
status or attractiveness and helps them to attain positive
future benefits. Although we do acknowledge that in specific
contexts, reputations for being prosocial could be taken
advantage of [25,26], in the majority of situations it would
yield positive future rewards [27,28]. Thus, the observabil-
ity–prosociality link should have clear boundary conditions
that maximize the chances for observability to enhance repu-
tation, status or attractiveness. In the meta-analysis, we test
this prediction directly and a number of other predictions
(detailed below).(b) Defining prosocial behaviour, observability and
different types of observation
Prosocial behaviour refers to a broad range of behaviours,
efforts or intentions designed to benefit the welfare of
individuals, groups, organizations or society [20,24]. Previous
researchers have suggested that observability relates to the visi-
bility of individuals’ behaviours [29]. As a working definition,
we suggest that the level of observability depends upon: (i)
what information is revealed about an individual’s identity
(i.e. name and facial photograph), and (ii) what is revealed
about that individual’s behaviour (i.e. whether they made a
donation or howmuch they donated). Using these two criteria,
observability manipulations within the literature can be cate-
gorized at the point of the prosocial decision into one of three
categories: perceived, pseudo and overt observability. Per-
ceived observability refers to situations where actual
information about both individual’s identity and their prosocial
behaviour is not observable. For example, the presence of
images of ‘watching eyes’ creates a subjective perception that
someone is watching the individual with no actual trans-
mission of identity or information about their behaviour [11].
Pseudo-observability refers to situations where information
about an individual’s behaviour is observed (i.e. how much
they donated), but no information about their actual identity
is revealed at the point of the prosocial act. Instead, indirect
identity information is revealed such as a participant identifi-
cation (ID) number. While the ID number may be used to
track whom people are playing with over rounds, and how
much they have donated, it does preclude people being able
to infer the person’s age or sex, for example. The participant
also knows what information others know about them. For
example, studies that compare single-blind conditions where
an experimenter knows the participant’s ID number and
donation amount to double-blind control conditions [30].
Finally, overt observability relates to manipulations where
both actual identity information (e.g. name and face) and
donating behaviour are revealed to an audience at or after the
point of decision and this is known to the participant before
their decision is made. For example, [31] used a public goods
game where each player had their name, photograph and
contribution displayed to all other players in the game.
(c) Moderators of observability
We outline predictions for five theoretical mechanisms that
can moderate the observability and prosociality relationship
(e.g. decisions with consequences), as well as, examining
several methodological moderators.
(d) Theoretical moderators
(i) Type of observability manipulation
All theories (CST, competitive altruism and reciprocity
models) predict that overt manipulations of observability,
where there is the strongest opportunity to build a reputation,
should lead to the highest levels of prosociality.
(ii) Observer type
We categorize observers into four distinct levels: (i) no one is
observing (includes perceived manipulations), (ii) only an
experimenter is observing, (iii) peers are watching (other
participants performing the experiment), and (iv) passive




3are not participants or experimenters). An important feature of
reciprocity is that others have the ability to recompense a victim
or punish a transgressor [32,33]. Thus, we would expect that
peers will have more of an effect on prosociality than having
an experimenter watching, a passive observer, or having no
observers (e.g. in the case of ‘watching eyes’).
(iii) Decisions with consequences
We distinguish between consequence-free decisions and
decisions with consequences. Consequence-free decisions are
when the actor performs a behaviour (e.g. a financial allo-
cation) expecting their behaviour not to influence how others
will respond to them within the experimental protocol.
Decisions with consequences occur where actors expect their
behaviour to influence how others will respond towards
them within the experimental protocol. Again all theories
(CST, competitive altruism and reciprocity) predict that effects
of observability will be maximal with consequential decisions.
(iv) Single or repeated interactions
Repeated interactions with the same person/people facilitate
reputation building [34]. Thus, reciprocity theory would
predict that repeated tasks involving multiple interactions
with the same individuals should lead to more prosocial
behaviour if the acts are observable.
(v) Bargaining and social dilemma games
Social dilemmas are played with a group of people (e.g. public
goods games usually have four players), whereas bargaining
games tend to be played between two people (e.g. dictator
games). The more players within the game, the larger the
audience for the observed prosocial behaviour and the
increased potential for reputation building [35]. In addition,
the structures of the two types of games vary. Social dilemmas
involve a trade-off between short-term interest and the long-
term collective interests, and bargaining games involve a
trade-off between personal outcomes and the outcomes of
others [36]. Thus, social dilemmas involve long-term consi-
deration about one’s contributions to a common resource
and the opportunity to enhance one’s reputation within a
group. Bargaining games encourage more short-term profit-
maximizing behaviour and offer less opportunity for reputation
building. Thus, we predict a stronger effect of observability on
prosociality in social dilemmas owing to the larger audience
and the longer reputation management that is needed.
(e) Methodological moderators
These moderators are not mechanisms per se, but rather
reflect experimental design choices that may influence the
observability–prosociality link.
(i) Age
There may be developmental trends on the impact of observa-
bility on prosociality; therefore, we include age as a continuous
covariate. Evidence within children (less than 12 years old) for
observability effects on prosocial behaviour is mixed with
some studies finding observable scenarios increase prosocial
behaviour [37,38], while others find no effect [39]. We make
no specific prediction about the effect of observability on
prosociality in children.(ii) Type of payment
Payment of participants can bedoneusing avariety ofmethods,
for example, raffles, conditional lotteries and flat fees. We cate-
gorized payments into three broad categories: no payment,
one-off payment and performance-related pay (i.e. payment
is conditional upon participant’s decisions/behaviour). All
theories would suggest that performance-related payments
ought to lead to high prosocial behaviour under observability
because it provides a clearer signal of generosity.
(iii) The context of study
A number of papers suggest that the level of prosociality in
the field is lower than in the laboratory [40,41]. Therefore,
the context of the study might act to moderate the observabil-
ity and prosociality relationship with field studies having
smaller effects than laboratory studies.
(iv) Nature of outcome
When analysing prosocial behaviour, researchers examine the
decision to give or not (yes versus no) and how much to
give, when giving is chosen [42]. Nettle et al.’s [16] meta-analy-
sis on the ‘watching eyes effect’ on prosocial behaviour found
that while the presence of images of ‘watching eyes’ seemed
to affect the likelihood of donating (yes versus no decisions),
it did not affect the amount donated. We explore whether
this effect is observed in the wider observability literature.
(v) Unearned versus earned endowments
A number of studies show that when participants earn money
during an experiment, as opposed to just simply receiving
money (endowment/windfall), levels of generosity decrease
[43]. As earned money entails property rights, donations signal
a cost to that individual which could constitute an honest
signal [35]. Thus, we predict that effects of observability will be
greater for earned compared with unearned endowments.
(vi) Measures of outcome
We investigate whether the measurement of prosocial behav-
iour involved objective measures (e.g. expenditure of money)
or subjective measures (e.g. self- or peer-reported intentions
to perform a prosocial behaviour). The intention-behaviour
gap is well established [44], and intentions to help can be a
cost-free means to enhance reputation. Therefore, we expect
to see stronger observability effects on prosocial behaviour
in studies assessing self-reported intentions than studies
assessing behaviour. That is people will be more likely to
say they will help when it does not cost them, especially
when observed.
(vii) Type of prosocial behaviour
The effects of observability have been researched over a variety
of different prosocial activities: blood donation [10], donations
to charity [10], donation to peers [13], volunteering time to
charities [45,46], performing effortful tasks to raise money for
charity [47], and voting [14]. All models predict, to different
extents, that social recognition occurs in proportion to the
cost of generosity signalled [46]. It could be argued that non-
monetary forms of prosocial behaviour signal greater cost
with respect to social impact (time and effort) because, at the
point of donation, the amount of time given or blood that is
donated incurs a known effortful cost, while the origin of the
rspb.royalsocietypublishin
4money being donated (windfall or effort fully earned) is less
transparent. Thus, while someone may incur effort and
time to gain money, this effort is not necessarily specifically
linked to prosociality—it may just be their everyday work.
At the point of donation, donating money is relatively less
effortful and time-consuming than volunteering or donating
blood. Thus, we predict that observability will show a stronger





Studies were identified through searching electronic databases,
backward citation searches and contacting authors for unpub-
lished data. Five electronic databases were searched: Web of
Science, Psychinfo, Econ Papers, Taylor and Francis and the
Applied Social Science Index and Abstracts (ASSIA). Searches
comprised the combination of seven terms forobservability (obser-
vability, visibility, public, reputation, signalling, anonymity,
image) and seven terms for prosociality (money, blood, volunteer,
recycle, altruism, prosocial, public good). All searches were con-
ducted from 25 November 2015 to 31 March 2017. A total of
11 339 articles were searched via titles and abstracts. Of the
11 339 articles, 114 were identified as being potentially relevant.
Backward citation searching through the 117 records led to another
55 papers being identified (number of papers: 169). An email was
then sent to first authors (n ¼ 61) requesting any unpublished data
which produced further 18 papers (total number of papers: 187). A
reviewer recommended a further 15 papers (total number of
papers: 202). The full text of the remaining 202 articles was
inspected and 83 articles that did not fulfil our eligibility criteria
(see below) were excluded (see the electronic supplementary
material, S5 PRISMA Flow Diagram, electronic supplementary
material, figure S2).
(b) Inclusion and exclusion strategy
The following inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied. First,
studies had to include: (i) an observability manipulation (where
the extent of participants actions and/or identity have been
revealed, to some degree, to others whether actual or perceived),
(ii) a control group (a group that received no manipulation or
received manipulation that did not affect their observability),
and (iii) a measure of prosocial behaviour (intentions or behaviour
that benefited either an individual, group, organization or society)
(67 out of 202 records did not match these criteria). A number of
papers, especially those looking at indirect reciprocity, appear rel-
evant to include but fail to provide a control group or visibility
manipulation hence cannot be used to generate effect sizes (i.e.
[48–51]). For example, in Milinski et al. [7], all players in the indir-
ect reciprocity game have their decision to give or keep publically
displayed each round (no control group) or in Bo´ [51] all players
playing the Prisoner Dilemma games are anonymous to other
players (no manipulation of visibility). Second, papers had to be
written in English. Third, studies had to provide primary quanti-
tative data (i.e. theoretical paper, simulations or qualitative
papers were not included) (nine records did not match this cri-
terion). We did not impose age restrictions on papers in the
present review but included age as a continuous moderating vari-
able instead. Fourth, no restrictions were placed on the years they
were published or on publication type (i.e. working papers, theses
were also included). Finally, papers were searched to remove
duplicates (seven records were removed) and requests were sent
to authors when not enough information to compute effect sizes
were reported (two records were removed).After applying all the inclusion and exclusion criteria, there
were 117 papers with a total sample of 788 164 and 134 indepen-
dent study level effects (independent effects that represent a study).
(c) Coding scheme
See the electronic supplementary material S6 Coding Scheme
(electronic supplementary material, table S4) for details of the
coding framework.
(d) Overview of the analysis
The effect sizes computed represent the difference between a con-
trol condition and an observability manipulation. Fischer’s Zr
was used for all the analyses, but for ease of interpretation,
these are converted back to Pearson’s r when reporting effects.
The correlation coefficient r was computed using sample sizes
and t-values, x2-values, p-values, means and standard devi-
ations, as well as, 2  2 contingency tables. Effect sizes are all
scored such that the higher the correlation, the stronger the
effect of observability on prosociality.
A random-effectsmodelwas used to compute the overall effect
size of observability on prosociality (for justification of model
choice, see the electronic supplementary material S7 Overview of
Analysis). To handle non-independence, effect sizes were aggre-
gated using the Hunter & Schmidt [52] method which combines
within-study effects while taking account of the correlation in
the within-study effects [52]. Effect sizes that were independent
received no corrections.
Cochran’s Q-test, a measure of homogeneity among effect
sizes, was conducted to test whether the assumption that all
effect sizes are estimating the same population mean is reason-
able. To measure the degree of heterogeneity, the inconsistency
index (I2) and tau squared (t2) were calculated (For details, see
the electronic supplementary material S7 Overview of Analysis).
Publication bias was assessed visually with a funnel plot
(effect size plotted against the standard error) and statistically
using Egger’s Regression test. The Duval and Tweedie [53]
trim and fill procedure was also applied (For details, see the
electronic supplementary material S7 Overview of Analysis).
To explore heterogeneity, mixed-effect models are conducted
using both theoretical and methodological moderators. To assess
the overall effect of multiple moderators within mixed-effect
models, omnibus tests of all themodel coefficients were conducted
(referred to as QM). Effect sizes were calculated using comprehen-
sive meta-analysis [54], while all other analyses were conducted in
R STUDIO (v. 0.98.1062) using R (v. 3.1.1) with theMAc andMetafor
packages [55,56].
(e) Coding frame reliability
The reliability of the coding framework was tested on 32% of
studies (k ¼ 43) by a rater who was blind to the initial coding
(see the electronic supplementary material, S7 Overview of
Analysis). The kappa coefficients indicate substantial agreement
(mean kappa ¼ 0.86, s.d. ¼ 0.13, min ¼ 0.67, max ¼ 1.00) [57].3. Results
(a) Overall effects of observability on prosocial
behaviour
Anoverview of the effect sizes and 95% confidence intervals for
each study can be found in the electronic supplementary mate-
rial, S1Overviewof Studies (electronic supplementarymaterial,
table S1).
The analysis revealed a small positive and significant associ-
ation between observability and prosociality r (r ¼ 0.141, 95%
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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5confidence interval lower limit (LLCI)/upper limit (ULCI)¼
0.101/0.175). The results showed a substantial level of variation
(Q (133) ¼ 10883.758, p, 0.001) among the distribution of
effect sizes which can be accounted for by the large amount
of heterogeneity within the sampled studies (I2 ¼ 99.24; t ¼
0.179; t2 ¼ 0.032). ‘Leave one out’ sensitivity analysis was
performed, where the model is run systematically leaving out
one study each time. This showed the overall effect fluctuated
slightly from r ¼ 0.135 to r ¼ 0.144, but to be stable. Trim and
fill analysis and Egger’s regression test indicated no publica-
tion bias (see the electronic supplementary material, S2
Publication Bias and figure S1). oc.R.Soc.B
285:20180(b) Moderators of observability
In this section, we explore theoretical and methodological
moderators that might account for some of the heterogeneity
(see the electronic supplementary material, S3 Univariate
Moderator Analyses and table S2).116(i) Theoretical moderators
Type of observability manipulation. While the effect of observ-
ability on prosociality was largest for overt manipulations
(r ¼ 0.172, LLCI/ULCI¼ 0.113/0.232, k ¼ 60) followed by
pseudo-observability (r ¼ 0.167, LLCI/ULCI¼ 0.081/0.252,
k ¼ 20) and perceived observability (r ¼ 0.100, LLCI/ULCI ¼
0.050/0.149, k ¼ 49) manipulations, there was no overall
significant difference across observability manipulations (QM
(2) ¼ 3.572, p ¼ 0.167).
Observer type. Observer type was split into three dummy
coded variables using no observer (perceived manipulations)
as reference: experimenter, peers and passive observer.
Observer type significantly moderated observability and
prosocial behaviour (QM (3) ¼ 13.246, p ¼ 0.004) with pas-
sive observers (r ¼ 0.352, LLCI/ULCI ¼ 0.225/0.478, k ¼ 12)
having a significantly larger positive effect on prosociality
than no observer (r ¼ 0.100, LLCI/ULCI ¼ 0.050/0.149, k ¼
49). All other observer types were not significantly different
from having no observers (experimenter: r ¼ 0.200, LLCI/
ULCI ¼ 0.090/0.309, k ¼ 12; peers: r ¼ 0.154, LLCI/ULCI ¼
0.085/0.224, k ¼ 45). Passive observers also had a signifi-
cantly larger effect on prosociality than peers (QM (1) ¼
7.30, p ¼ 0.007). No other comparisons were significantly
different.
Decisions with consequences. Decisions with consequences
had a significantly (QM (1) ¼ 7.365, p ¼ 0.007) larger effect
on the link between observability and prosociality than those
with no consequences (decisions with consequences: r ¼
0.248, LLCI/ULCI ¼ 0.148/0.348, k ¼ 24; consequence-free:
r ¼ 0.119, LLCI/ULCI ¼ 0.084/0.154, k ¼ 110).
Single or repeated measures. Single versus repeated measure
significantly moderated the link between observability and
prosociality (QM (1) ¼ 12.44, p, 0.001), with single studies
having smaller effects (r ¼ 0.106, LLCI/ULCI ¼ 0.070/0.143,
k ¼ 94) than studies using repeated measures (repeated: r ¼
0.269, LLCI/ULCI ¼ 0.179/0.358, k ¼ 25).
Bargaining games and social dilemmas. The type of economic
game (bargaining versus social dilemma) had a significant
moderating effect (QM (1) ¼ 6.963, p ¼ 0.008), with social
dilemmas having a larger effect (bargaining games: r ¼ 0.119,
LLCI/ULCI ¼ 0.072/0.165, k ¼ 74; social dilemma games:
r ¼ 0.251, LLCI/ULCI ¼ 0.157/0.344, k ¼ 26).(ii) Methodological moderators
Age. The continuous variable of age had no moderating effect
(QM (1) ¼ 0.219, p ¼ 0.639) on the observability andprosociality
relationship (r¼ -0.001, LLCI/ULCI¼ -0.005/0.003, k¼ 65).
Type of payment. While one-off payments had the smallest
effect on the link between observability and prosocial
behaviour (r ¼ 0.080, LLCI/ULCI ¼ -0.021/0.181, k ¼ 18)
followed by no payment (r ¼ 0.139, LLCI/ULCI ¼ 0.085/
0.194, k ¼ 18) and performance-related payment (r ¼ 0.157,
LLCI/ULCI ¼ 0.106/0.208, k ¼ 80), there was no significant
overall difference across payment types (QM (2) ¼ 1.896, p ¼
0.388). There was also no difference between one-off payments
andperformance-related payments (QM (1) ¼ 1.816, p ¼ 0.178).
Context of the study. The study context (laboratory versus
field) had a moderating influence on the observability–
prosociality link (QM (1) ¼ 6.215, p ¼ 0.013), with laboratory
studies having larger effects than non-laboratory studies
(laboratory: r ¼ 0.170, LLCI/ULCI ¼ 0.125/0.215, k ¼ 99;
non-laboratory: r ¼ 0.077, LLCI/ULCI ¼ 0.033/0.121, k ¼ 35).
Single blind/double blind. There was no moderating effect
(QM (1) ¼ 0.955, p ¼ 0.328) of single or double blind on the
observability–prosociality link (single blind: r ¼ 0.130,
LLCI/ULCI ¼ 0.92/0.168, k ¼ 106; double blind: r ¼ 0.178,
LLCI/ULCI ¼ 0.087/0.268, k ¼ 18).
Nature of outcome.Therewasno significantmoderating effect
of the nature of the outcome (QM (1) ¼ 0.419, p ¼ 0.517,
whether to give: r ¼ 0.131, LLCI/ULCI¼ 0.066/0.196, k ¼ 29;
howmuch togive: r¼ 0.161,LLCI/ULCI¼ 0.113/0.209, k¼ 78).
Unearned versus earned.Whether the endowmentwasearned
or unearned was not a significant moderator (QM (1) ¼ 1.374,
p ¼ 0.241) of the link between observability and prosociality
(earned: r ¼ 0.222, LLCI/ULCI ¼ 0.065/0.379, k ¼ 10;
unearned: r ¼ 0.133, LLCI/ULCI¼ 0.087/0.180, k ¼ 91).
Measures of outcome. There was no significant moderating
effect of subjective versus objective measures (QM (1)¼ 1.13,
p¼ 0.288: subjective: r¼ 0.081, LLCI/ULCI¼ 20.010/0.172,
k¼ 10; objective: r¼ 0.146, LLCI/ULCI ¼ 0.109/0.183, k¼ 122).
Type of prosocial behaviour. The type of prosocial behaviour
(monetary donations versus non-monetary donations) did
not significantly moderate (QM (1) ¼ 0.686, p ¼ 0.408) the
link between observability and prosocial behaviour (monetary:
r ¼ 0.151, LLCI/ULCI ¼ 0.107/0.195, k ¼ 101; non-monetary:
r ¼ 0.115, LLCI/ULCI¼ 0.067/0.163, k ¼ 33).
Aggregated data. There was no significant moderating
effect of aggregated versus non-aggregated data (QM (1) ¼
3.597, p ¼ 0.058); however, studies that aggregated their
data did have larger effects than non-aggregated data (non-
aggregated: r ¼ 0.133, LLCI/ULCI ¼ 0.099/0.166, k ¼ 129;
aggregated: r ¼ 0.290, LLCI/ULCI ¼ 0.059/0.521, k ¼ 5).
(c) Meta-regression
A meta-regression was conducted on the significant modera-
tors (see the electronic supplementary material, S4 Meta
Regression and table S3). The effect of using single or repeated
measures was the only significant predictor suggesting that
those studies that used repeated measure generally reported
larger effects (r ¼ 0.14, LLCI/ULCI ¼ 0.003/0.276.)4. Discussion
The last three decades of research on the relationship between




6andwe suggest this is owing to the inclusion or omission of key
theoretical design features in the studies, that represent the key
mechanisms facilitating the observability–prosociality link.
These mark the boundary conditions for the observability–
prosociality link and we report a meta-analytic review
to examine these. In this review, we found observabi-
lity had overall a small positive association with prosociality
(r ¼ 0.141). Four mechanisms of the decision-making context
moderated this relationship. Three are consistent with pre-
dictions from CST, competitive altruism and reciprocity
theory: (i) in contexts where participants make decisions with
consequences for themselves (decisions that could influence
how others respond to them), the effect of observability
is larger, (ii) repeated games have larger effects on the
observability–prosociality link than single games, and (iii)
the effect of observability in social dilemmas was larger than
in bargaining games. The fourth mechanistic finding, that the
presence of passive observers strengthened the observability
and prosociality link, is not consistent with theory. Finally,
one methodological moderator was significant: the effect
of observability was larger in laboratory studies than in
field studies.
To contextualize the theoretical and practical interpret-
ations of these findings, we should refer to the limitations of
this meta-analysis. First, we applied mixed-effect models
which can be overly conservative [58] owing to an overestima-
tion of the sample error variance. This leads to confidence
intervals that are toowide, and as a result, the amount of infor-
mation gained from the meta-analysis is reduced [59].
However, adopting mixed-effect models makes sense because
it assumes a degree of systematic variation (moderators) and
some random population variation [58].
Second, the majority (80%, k ¼ 94) of the studies in this
meta-analysis come from western, industrialized countries;
therefore, caution is needed when generalizing the effects of
visibility on prosocial behaviour beyond western, educated,
industrialized, rich and democratic societies [60].
Third, most of the studies (73%, k ¼ 99) within the meta-
analysis are experimental, with random allocation to condition
and exogenous manipulations of observability which allows
tentative inferences to be made regarding the causality of
observability on enhancing prosocial behaviour.(a) Theoretical implications
The main contribution of the meta-analysis is to identify the
boundary conditions for the observability–prosociality link.
While we show that observability has a small positive and
significant effect on prosociality, importantly we show that
this varies significantly as a function of key mechanistic mod-
erators suggested by theory (CST, competitive altruism and
indirect reciprocity).
Moderator analyses showed that different types of obser-
vability manipulations (perceived, pseudo and overt) all have
a small positive effect on prosocial behaviour, with slightly
larger effects in pseudo and overt manipulations. Northover
et al. [17] in their meta-analyses on the ‘watching eyes’
effect reported no overall effect of images of watching eyes
on prosociality which is not comparable with the small
effect of perceived visibility we report here. This is owing
to our index of perceived visibility including studies that
use manipulations other than watching eyes [61,62]. For
example, Uziel & Hefetz [62] used a sentence completiontask priming either a private or public mindset. In addition,
Northover et al. [17] excluded some studies that are included
in the current meta-analysis. For example, Northover et al.
[17] excluded studies that reported their findings at aggre-
gated levels (e.g. Powell et al. [63] report results per 1000s
of customers). The effect of perceived manipulations could
be susceptible to individual differences such as sensitivity
to conformity and social pressure [64,65].
Three findings are consistent with predictions that observa-
bility enhances prosociality: (i) in contexts where participants
make decisionswith consequences for themselves, (ii) repeated
games, and (iii) in social dilemmas.
The present findings indicate that decisions with conse-
quences have a positive moderating influence on the
observability–prosociality link compared to consequence-free
decisions. In studieswhere decisions had consequences, partici-
pants’ performance on one economic game could influence
how others responded to them in a subsequent game [22,31].
Alternatively, participants’ previous contribution history were
made observable to others [66]. This findingmakes sense theor-
etically from cost signalling, competitive altruism or indirect
reciprocity perspectives because, in circumstances where there
are imminent future rewards, allocators should wish to posi-
tively advertise their cooperative qualities to increase the
likelihood of being the beneficiary of those rewards [35,45].
Theoretically, the only danger of generosity in public context,
where the observer knows that allocators are acting generously
to secure future rewards, is that the signal could be perceived to
be dishonest and could cast doubt over the cooperative qualities
being signalled [22].
Repeated measure games had a stronger positive effect
than single games. This can be explained from an indirect
reciprocity perspective because repeated measure games
allow individuals to build up reputations over time through
consistent generous behaviour [67]. This benefits individuals
with good reputations, because they are likely to receive more
cooperative behaviour from others in the future [34].
Repeated interactions also build up a history of generous or
selfish behaviour which can be used by others to more confi-
dently judge whether this individual is someone whom they
wish to interact with [34].
The results also showed that social dilemma games had a
stronger effect on the observability–prosociality link compared
with bargaining games. This effect couldbe attributable to social
dilemmas providing greater opportunity to build reputations
than bargaining games. For instance, social dilemma games,
like the public goods game, are often played with multiple
players (typically four players) while bargaining style games
are often dyadic. Therefore, a typical public goods game under
observable conditions allows players to signal their cooperation
to three other players, while a typical dictator game gives the
opportunity to signal their altruism to another player.
Not predicted by theory, we found that observer typewas a
substantial moderator of prosocial behaviour with passive
observers (someonewho is not participating in the experiment
nor conducting the study) having a stronger effect on the obser-
vability–prosociality link than having no actual audience (the
sense of being watched). While not predicted by theory, this
moderating effect may be because of the high level of scrutiny
allocators experienced during studies using passive observer
designs [68]. For example, in Filiz-Ozbay & Ozbay [69]’s
study, observers stood directly behind participants, watching




7interesting as it suggests that it is not just the question of
whether a behaviour is observable, but also the intensity
of observation that matters. Following the suggestion of one
of the reviewers, an alternative explanation of the passive
observer effect concerns the intensity and ambiguity of the
observer’s role. This may cause the participant to question
what would happen if theymet the observer outside of the lab-
oratory context. Owing to the intensity of observation, the
observer is likely to remember them beyond the experiment
andmight use their impression of them during the experiment
to influence how they behave towards the participants in the
real world.
There was one methodological moderator with laboratory
studies having a stronger effect on the observability–
prosociality link compared to non-laboratory studies. It is not
unusual for there to be a disparity between behaviour within
the laboratory or conducted within the field [40,70]. A possible
explanation for this result is that manipulations of observabil-
ity within the laboratory can be more tightly controlled, will
be less subject to the influence of extraneous variables and
hence be more effective than is possible within the field.(b) Practical implications
The main finding that observability enhances prosocial behav-
iour suggests that charities should continue to use observability
manipulations as part of their fundraising strategies. In addition
to charities, private organizations and public bodies should
consider using observability manipulations as they have been
found to affect awide range of prosocial behaviour like increas-
ing voter turnout, donating blood, volunteering and littering
[10,45,71,72]. The moderator analyses suggest that certain fea-
tures of observability manipulations are likely to producelarger effects. For example, framing the donation decision for
the donor as a decision with consequences rather than as a con-
sequence-free decision should enhance the impact of visibility
on prosocial behaviour. This can be illustrated using the
example of ‘The Ice-Bucket Challenge’. Individuals were nomi-
nated publically via social media to make a decision with a
consequence: either they donated to the charity and performed
the ice-bucket challenge (enduring water and ice thrown over
themselves) or they refused and did not take part with the sub-
sequent risk of losing face or reputation in front of peers on
social networking sites [73].
5. Conclusion
Charities and researchers have shown a lot of interest in the
effects of observability on prosocial behaviour. The main sub-
stantive finding of the current meta-analysis was the small
positive effect that observability had on prosocial behaviour.
Furthermore, this meta-analysis also revealed that studies
that used particularly close observations of behaviour and
gave allocators decisions with consequences tended to have
the largest effects on prosociality.
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